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Abstract. Given the signiﬁcant amount of personal information available on the
Web, verifying its correct use emerges as an important issue. When personal in-
formation is published, it should be later used under a set of usage policies. If
these policies are not followed, sensitive data could be exposed and used against
its owner. Under these circumstances, processing transparency is desirable since
it allows users to decide whether information is used appropriately. It has been
argued that data provenance can be used as the mechanism to underpin such a
transparency. Thereby, if provenance of data is available, processing becomes
transparent since the provenance of data can be analysed against usage policies
to decide whether processing was performed in compliance with such policies.
The aim of this paper is to present a Provenance-based Compliance Framework
that uses provenance to verify the compliance of processing to predeﬁned infor-
mation usage policies. It consists of a provenance-based view of past processing
of information, a representation of processing policies and a comparison stage in
which the past processing is analysed against the processing policies. This paper
also presents an implementation using a very common on-line activity: on-line
shopping
1.
1 Introduction
Due to the increasing number of Internet services that manage sensitive personal infor-
mation, the proper use of this information becomes a determinant issue for users who
want to access these services with a guarantee that their personal information is not
being misuse. Some research [14,4,8] is focused on developing better techniques to
avoid information misuse by restricting access to information. However, access restric-
tion alone cannot properly solve this problem on the Web, where information is widely
and public available. When information becomes accessible, verifying its correct use
after it was processed is also important. In order to solve this problem, users and organ-
isations should be able to deﬁne policies under which personal information can be pro-
cessed. In this context, information accountability, a property according to which users
can analyse the way in which their information was used, is desirable. Weitzner et al.
[16] and the W3C Provenance Incubator group [15] have argued that provenance, which
consists of causal dependencies between data and events explaining what contributed to
a result in a speciﬁc state [11], could be used to support information accountability to
help users to answer questions related to the processing of information [16]. If prove-
nance of data is available, processing becomes transparent since the provenance of data
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ships for Latin America, (E06D103956MX) and by the Mexican Council CONACyT (182546).can be analysed against usage policies to decide whether processing was performed in
compliance with such policies [1]. Information related to a speciﬁc processing can be
obtained from provenance information by means of a provenance query [10], the result
of which can be analysed to decide if the processing was performed in accordance with
a set of usage policies.
In order to support this vision, we have created a provenance-based Compliance
Framework that consists of a view of past information processing, a representation of
the policies that processing should follow and a comparison stage in which the past pro-
cessing is analysed against the processing policies. By using this framework, it is possi-
ble to decide if an application processed information in compliance to the predeﬁned in-
formation usage policies. The framework components exploit provenance for represent-
ing both past execution and the rules to comply with. They are platform-independent
and reusable, as they can be applied to different systems to verify different policies.
They are also represented as an OPM [12] specialisation. In that way, any system using
OPM can make use of this framework. At the same time, our framework could be used
to create automatic auditing tools for verifying diverse policies over data processing.
The aim of this paper is to present this Compliance Framework; speciﬁcally, the
contributions of this paper are: (i) The Compliance Framework components, which
comprises the Processing View and the Usage Policies Deﬁnition, (ii) The Compliance
Framework Analysis Stage, in which its components are compared to check the correct
processing of information, and (iii) an implementation prototype.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In x2, an application example
is presented. In x3, the Compliance Framework’s components are presented and ex-
plained. In x4, the framework’s Analysis Stage and the algorithms used to verify some
requirements are explained. In x5, an implementation of the previously explained exam-
ple is presented. Finally, x6 discusses some related work and x7 offers some concluding
remarks.
2 Application Example
Consider the following scenario: Alice is trying to get pregnant, and so has decided to
take a fertility treatment (clomid). She decided to buy her treatment using the web page
of a pharmacy. In order to get her treatment, she needs to provide her name, address,
date of birth, gender and social security number. At the same time, but unrelated to
her attempt to get pregnant, she applies for a job in the same pharmacy - and she is
rejected. She suspects that the pharmacy may have checked its records related to her
name and realised that she has plans to have a family, and as a result marked her as a
high risk employee for expensive maternity costs. If this is true, the company obviously
misused Alice’s personal information. When she sent her personal information to the
pharmacy, she did that with the purpose of getting her treatment. From the point of
view of the company, the purpose is on-line sales. The on-line sales purpose could
include verifying the existence and the sales of the medicine (manage stock), charging
the amount to her card and sending the medicine to her home. The company can create
a record of the monthly sales to manage medicines’ stock. This record includes the
medicine’s name and the quantity sold. Nevertheless, such a record cannot contain the
name of the people that bought that item, as the purpose of that record is not to identifyeach person. By exposing the way in which the data sent by Alice was used, we can
verify if the pharmacy correctly used her information and, if not, make it accountable.
This example is represented in Figure 1 and analysed in the next sections to explain the
framework.
3 Compliance Framework
The Compliance Framework consists of a past processing view, which is called Pro-
cessing View, a policies representation, which is called Usage Policies Deﬁnition, and
an analysis stage. The Processing View and the Usage Policies Deﬁnition are repre-
sented by provenance graphs that are directed acyclic graphs whose vertices represent
data and edges relationships between such data. Data includes purposes (pi), which are
the intentions for which a set of data is to be collected, tasks (ti), which are the pro-
cesses performed over data, data that is to be collected (DCi) and processed (DIi), and
results (ri), which are the outputs of a task.
3.1 Processing View
The Processing View (PV) (Figure 1(a)) represents a provenance graph captured at ex-
ecution time. We assume the entities involved in the processing of private information
are capturing the corresponding provenance information following the approach pre-
sented in [1]. Also, to trust in the outcomes of the analysis stage, we assume that this
view is secured in the way described in [2]. This view represents a process in which
an application requests a set of data from a user, making explicit the purpose for which
such a set is acquired (collection purpose). After checking the application purpose, the
user send the requested multiset of data instances (collected data). The goal of the ap-
plication is to achieve the collection purpose. For that reason, a task is initiated by the
given purpose (processing purpose). Such a task uses a multiset of data instances that
is a subset of the collected data (used data). Later, the task is executed with the used
data as input and generates results. Such results could be used as collected data in the
execution of another task. The Processing View Graph GV can be deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 1 (Processing View Graph). Let us consider a set of purposes PV , a set
of tasks TV , a multiset of collected data instances DCV , a multiset of used data in-
stances DUV , a multiset of results RV and a set of relationship’s names RelV =
fwasInitiatedBy;used;contained;wasGeneratedBy;wasAcquiredForg.
A Processing View Graph GV = (VV ;EV ;RelV ) is a directed acyclic graph, where
VV  PV [TV [DCV [DUV [RV , EV  (TV PV RelV )[(TV DUV RelV )[
(DUV DCV RelV )[(RV TV RelV )[(DCV PV RelV )[(DUV RV RelV ).
3.2 Usage Policies Deﬁnition
The Usage Policies Deﬁnition (UPD) (Figure 1(b)) is a representation of the processing
policies that are veriﬁed with the framework. These policies should be followed by ap-
plications while users’ personal information is being processed. Each policy represents
the way in which a set of data can be used, i.e. which tasks can use a certain multiset ofFig.1. Compliance Framework Components
datatoaccomplishwhichpurpose.Thisdeﬁnitioncontainsasetofpurposesfromwhich
users’ data is collected, the set of tasks that are initiated by a speciﬁc purpose and a
multiset of data types that a speciﬁc task uses in its execution. Note that this component
contains more than one purpose and each purpose has more than one task. However,
one task could be related to more than one purpose. The Usage Policies Deﬁnition GR
can be deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 2 (Usage Policies Deﬁnition Graph). Let us consider a set of purposes
PR, a set of tasks TR, a multiset of data types DR, and a set of relationship’s names
RelR = fwasInitiatedBy;usedg.
A Usage Policies Deﬁnition Graph GR = (VR;ER;RelR) is a directed acyclic
graph, where VR  PR [ TR [ DR, ER  (TR  PR  RelR) [ (TR  DR  RelR).
4 Analysis Stage
In this stage, by using the already described components, it is possible to verify several
information usage requirements, such as (A) Purpose Compliance: Processing of data
is compatible with the purpose for which it was captured and (B) Minimun Information
Set: Only information to be processed was captured. Due to space restrictions, we focus
on (A). The veriﬁcation of these requirements is performed by comparing the past pro-
cessing, described in the Processing View, against the expected processing, represented
by the Usage Policies Deﬁnition. To do this, information related to the requirement is
extracted from the Processing View in form of a subgraph. Then, the data and the rela-
tionships of such a subgraph are compared with the content of the Usage Policies Deﬁ-
nition. The Purpose Compliance requirement states that the data used when performing
a task should be data to only accomplish the initially stated purpose. The veriﬁcation
of this requirement includes to check if the correct type of data was used, if data was
used to accomplish the stated valid purposes and, if data is reused, the processing is also
made according to the stated purposes. From which, we derive the subrequirements (1)Used Data Compliance, (2) Purposes Validation and (3) Reusing Results, respectively.
Next, the extracted subgraphs related to each of these subrequirements are formally de-
ﬁned, the comparison process is explained presenting its corresponding algorithms and
an example.
(1) Used Data Compliance Here, we verify that the used data has the correct data type
related to the task that used it and the purpose that initiated such a task. We also verify
that the purpose and the task are in the corresponding Usage Policies Deﬁnition. To this
end, we extract from a Processing View Graph the provenance of a result. Speciﬁcally,
we focus on the task that generated such a result, the data instances that such a task used
and the purpose that initiated this task. This information is expressed as a subgraph of
A1, which is called Used Data Compliance.
Deﬁnition 3 (Used Data Compliance Subgraph (A1) ). Given a Processing View
Graph GV , we can extract a Used Data Compliance Subgraph A1 such that,
VA1 = fpi;DUi;tig
EA1 = f(ti;pi;wasInitiatedBy);(ti;DUi;used)g
where pi 2 PV ;ti 2 TV ;DUi 2 DV 2 RV and i = number of tasks:
Algorithm 1 Data Processed According to a Valid Purpose
input: GR = fVR;ER;RelRg;A1 = fVA1;EA1;RelA1g;pi 2 VA1;ti 2 VA1;DUi 
VA1;Dj  VR
if pi 2 VR then
if ti 2 VR then
for all x 2 RelA1 and y 2 RelR do
if x = y then return -1 . Label not matched
for all x 2 DUi do
if type(x) * Dj then return -2 . Type not matched
else return -3 . Not registered task
else return -4 . Not registered purpose
return 1 . Compliance
An example of this subgraph is presented in Figure 2(a). The UPD shows that the task
“manage stock” should use a string (medicine’s name) and an integer (medicine’s quan-
tity). However, as the PV depicts, this task used an extra data item: name. Therefore,
the processing presented in Figure 2(a) does not satisfy the Used Data Compliance Sub-
requirement. The veriﬁcation process of the Used Data Compliance subrequirement is
presented in Algorithm 1 2.
(2) Purposes Validation Here, we verify if the data was processed with a purpose
related to the one it was collected for. To this end, we extract from a Processing View
Graph the provenance of a set of tasks related to one set of collected data. Speciﬁcally,
2 The type of each instance is included in the provenance information and obtained using the accessor type.Fig.2. Extracted Subgraphs
we focus on the purposes from which such tasks were initiated and the purposes from
which the collected data was acquired. This is expressed in Figure 2(b) as the Purposes
Validation subgraph, which is deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 4 (Purposes Validation Subgraph (A2)). Given a Processing View Graph
GV , we can extract a Purposes Validation Subgraph A2 such that,
VA2 = fpi;DC;DUi;ti;p0
ig
EA2 = f(ti;p0
i;wasInitiatedBy);(ti;DUi;used);(DUi;DC;contained);
(DC;pi;wasAcquiredFor)g
where pi;p0
i 2 PV ;ti 2 TV ;DUi 2 DV ;DC 2 DV ;i = number of purposes
The Purposes Validation Subgraph is used to create a set of Processing Purposes
(P0), which contains all p0
i, and a set of Collection Purposes (P00), which contains all
pi.
Algorithm 2 Processing Purposes vs Collection Purposes
input: GR = fVR;ER;RelRg;A2 = fVA2;EA2;RelA2g;P
0 = fp
0
ig;P
00 = fpig
if P
0  P
00 then
if P
0  VR ^ P
00  VR then return 1 . Compliance
else return -1 . Not registered purpose
else return -2 . Not compatible purpose
Later, we verify if the Processing Purposes are contained in the Collection Pur-
poses, i.e. data was processed according to the purposes it was collected for. It is also
veriﬁed if both sets contain valid purposes, i.e. they are contained in the UPD. The
example presented in Figure 2(b) is in compliance with this subrequirement. The ex-
plained comparison process is presented in Algorithm 2.
(3) Reusing Data The previous requirements are used to verify the purposes related
to data that was collected and processed by the same entity. However, an entity mayFig.3. Extracted Subgraphs
use data generated by tasks executed by other entities. This data is referred as “reused
data” and it has its own processing purpose related to the task that produced it. To
be in compliance to Requirement A, such a processing purpose should be related to
the purposes for which data is reused. To this end, we extract from a Processing View
Graph the provenance of the reused results that are the intersection of a collected data
multiset related to one entity and a used data multiset related to one task executed by
the same entity. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the task that generated such a reused data and
the purpose from which such a task was initiated. This is expressed by the Reusing Data
Subgraph of GV , which is deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 5 (Reusing Data Subgraph (A3)). Given a Processing View Graph GV , we
can extract a Reusing Data Subgraph A3 such that,
VA3 = fRj;tj;p0
jg
EA3 = f(Rj;tj;wasInitiatedBy);(tj;p0
j;wasGeneratedBy)g
where pj 2 PV ;tj 2 TV ;Rj 2 RV and j = number of reused data
Algorithm 3 Reusing Data
input: GR = fVR;ER;RelRg;A3 = fVA3;EA3;RelA3g;P
0  GR;P
00  GR;p 2 VA3
if p 2 P
0 and p 2 P
00 then return 1 . Compatible purpose
else return -1 . Not compatible purpose
In the example presented in Figure 3(a), the reusing of the result of the task “manage
stock” is presented. Some data items of this result are used in a new task with purpose
“marketing”. However, the result was initiated by the purpose “on-line sale”. Therefore,
reusing this result is not in compliance with the initial purpose. The veriﬁcation process
of this subrequirement is presented in Algorithm 3.5 Implementation
To show how the Provenance-based Compliance Framework is used, we implement the
previously presented example. Due to the lack of space, we focus on the queries used to
obtain the information we need to verify the subrequirement “Used Data Compliance”.
To this end, the processing view graph, which is presented in Figure 4(a), is represented
as an RDF OPM Graph [12] and the queries are implemented using SPARQL. Initially,
Fig.4. Implementation Example
we verify the ship medicine task. To this end, we extract the used data (DU) using the
SPARQL query presented in Figure 4(b). We also need to extract the purpose (p) that
initiated the ship medicine task by executing the query presented in 4(c). The task name
(t) is extracted by using a similar query, which is not shown for the given space restric-
tions. Then, the obtained information (DU, p, t) along with the corresponding Usage
Policies Deﬁnition, are used as the input of Algorithm 1. After executing this algorithm,
the result is that the task ship medicine is in compliance with the given requirement, so
we can say that the processing of Alice’s data by this task was in compliance. The task
manage stock can be analysed in a similar way. If we extract the necessary elements
related to this task and apply Algorithm 1, the result will be no compliance. The reason
is that a piece of data that is not part of the policies has been used: name. An inventory
of a pharmacy does not need the name of the customers, just the item that was sold and
the quantity of it. Then, we can say that the processing of Alice’s information by this
task was not in compliance, and therefore, such an inventory could be used against her
interest. In this case, to be marked as a high risk employee.6 Related Work
Recently,researchershaverealisedthatprovenancecanbeusedtoverifythecompliance
of different policies related to the use of personal information [6,5,13] and others use
different technologies to support compliance [3,9,7].
Hanson et al.[6] present a data-purpose algebra to annotate data with usage restric-
tions. With these restrictions, requirements similar to the ones presented here can be
checked. In this approach, each data is annotated after execution, contrary to our ap-
proach, where provenance information created at execution time is used. In terms of
implementation, they just present a prototype to verify requirements compliance. Gil et
al. [5] argue that computational workﬂow systems can be used to ensure and enforce the
appropriate use of sensitive personal data. Then, compliance, transparency and account-
ability can be supported by these systems. To this end, they deﬁne a set of requirements
that are similar to the ones we present here. Later, using workﬂow system to support
process transparency, the deﬁned requirements can be veriﬁed. They also propose to
use this technology to enforce policies and negotiate them. In our work, we propose
that given the openness of the Web to support compliance is more ﬂexible than enforce-
ment. Finally, they do not offer a practical solution as the one presented in this paper.
Ringelstein et al. [13] use a modiﬁed version of OPM to express processing execution
and an extended version of XACML to represent permission and restriction policies.
Then, by modelling conditions, enforcement is supported. As we previously mention,
we support accountability, not enforcement. We also create OPM-based rules, which
can be easily checked against any OPM-based view without any previous transforma-
tions.
In the business processes context, Ly et al.[9] present a similar work to check the
compliance of rules related to the quality of a product. They requirements are differ-
ent as they verify the executed order of processes. They use process-aware information
systems and process models to model the rules. Awad et al. [3] check compliance of
control ﬂow and data ﬂow in business process models by using BPMN to express pro-
cessmodelsandBPMN-Qtorepresentpolicies.Theydesignasetofqueriesandpresent
how violations occur by comparing predeﬁned patterns with the queries. These two ap-
proaches do not support the veriﬁcation of use of data items and are not based in an
open model, such as OPM. Kang et al. [7] also present a similar approach that helps
users to conform with existing policies in a social networks context. This is achieved
by making them aware of data usage restrictions deﬁned by the users. One drawback of
this work is that they just deﬁne a small set of policies, contrary to our framework, in
which any usage policy can be deﬁned. In that way, our framework can be applied to a
diversity of contexts.
There is also work on authorisation and enforcement of rules in databases [14,4,8].
However, given the openness of information on the Web and the possibility of inferring
information using previously published information, authorisation and enforcement are
very challenging to implement.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we present the provenance-based Compliance Framework by explaining
its components and how this framework can be applied to an application example overan on-line shopping scenario. With this example, we explain how our framework helps
us verify one (of more) requirement related to the processing of information. Our work
demonstrates that by using the Provenance-based Compliance Framework, individuals
orinstitutions,whichusedinformationinadifferentmannerfromthestated,canbeheld
accountable for misuse. Our framework comprises one past processing view, one novel
policies deﬁnition, which are platform independent and reusable, and one comparison
stage, which is easy to implement in an automatic way.
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